Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Utah v. Rodney Lehi : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Craig C.
Halls; San Juan County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
William L. Schultz; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Lehi, No. 20010139 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3132

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 200.10139-CA

v.
RODNEY LEHI,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §41-644 (SUPP. 1999), IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, IN
AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, PRESIDING
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-1080
WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ
69 East Center
P.O. Box 937
Moab, Utah 84532

CRAIG C. HALLS
San Juan County Attorney

Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED*: Q
Utah Court of Appeals

OCT 11 2001

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

RODNEY LEHI,

Case No. 20010139-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §41-644 (SUPP. 1999), IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, IN
AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, PRESIDING
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-1080
WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ
69 East Center
P.O. Box 937
Moab, Utah 84532

CRAIG C. HALLS
San Juan County Attorney

Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTION AI PRO\ ISIONS, S I A 11111 S \NI)Kl 1.1 S

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY ()I ARGUMENT
ARGUMENI
i.

TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT,
KNOWING HIS CONVICTION FOR DUI COULD BE ENHANCED
UNDER THE STATUTE BY PROOF OF ONLY TWO PRIOR DUI
CONVICTIONS, WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY AN INFORMATION
THAT ASSERTED HE HAD THREE PRIOR CONVICTIONS

6

A.

The Factual Background

7

li.

Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by any
variance between the information and the statutory
requirements for enhancement, of which he was aware

8

BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM
THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS
CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL, AND BECAUSE HE HAS FAILED TO ARGUE PLAIN
ERROR ON APPEAL, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO
CONSIDER HIS CLAIM
i

CONCLUSION

12

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A - Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules
ADDENDUM B - Trial Court's oral ruling

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

9

STATE CASES
Selvage v. State, 131 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1987)

9

State V.Alexander, 503 P.2d 777 (Ariz. 1977)

9

State v. Gonzalez, 2000 UT 136, 2P.3d954

11

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10P.2d346

2, 11

State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, 17P.3d 1153

2

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991)

1, 8

State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1995)

3

Stewart v. State, 856 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1993)

9

STATE STATUTES
Utah CONST, art. I § 12

2, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1999)

1, 2, 3, 6, 7,10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001)

1

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

RODNEY LEHI,

:

Defendant/ Appellant.

Case No. 20010139-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1999), in the Seventh Judicial
District Court, in and for San Juan County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson,
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Whether defendant, knowing his conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol could be enhanced by proof of only two prior driving under the influence of alcohol
convictions, was prejudiced by an information that asserted he had three such prior
convictions?
"The question of the adequacy of the notice given defendant is one of law," see State
v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991), and, accordingly, is reviewed for correctness.

See State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, If 10, 17 P.3d 1153 (appellate court reviews
questions of law for correctness).
2. Whether this Court should consider defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol where
defendant failed to preserve his claim in the trial court and has not alleged exceptional
circumstances or plain error on appeal?
An appellate court has no ground for considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
evidence where a defendant has failed to preserve the claim in the trial court and has not
alleged exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
f l l , 10P.3d346.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative statutes and rules are set out in Addendum A:
Utah Constitution, article I, section 12;
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rodney Lehi, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
("DUI") (Count I) and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license (Count II) (R. 12). The information also asserted that defendant had at least three prior conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, elevating the underlying DUI offense, a class B
misdemeanor, to a third degree (R. 1). The parties stipulated that the underlying DUI would
be tried to a jury and the issue of defendant's prior DUI convictions would be decided by the
2

trial court (R. 117:141-42; Aplt. Br. at 6). The jury found defendant guilty on both counts (R.
117:174-75). Thereafter, the trial court found that defendant had been convicted of two prior
DUI offenses within six years of defendant's DUI violation in this case (R. 108; 117:181-82;
118:5-6). Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (6)(a) (Supp. 1999), the trial
court found defendant's DUI conviction was a third degree felony (R. 111; 118:6).l The trial
court sentenced defendant to a statutory zero-to-five-year term (R. 111).2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3
At trial, Trooper Rick Eldredge of the Utah Highway Patrol testified for the State (R.
117:80-132). OnNovember9,1999, Eldredge was on patrol in San Juan County (R. 117:81,
83, 112). Eldredge was going north on Highway 191, just outside of Blanding, Utah, when
he spotted defendant walking south along the highway (R. 117:83). Eldredge had already
passed this location going southbound about forty-five minutes to one hour earlier and had
not seen defendant or defendant's vehicle (R. 117:83-84). Upon seeing defendant, Eldredge
made a U-turn and pulled up along side defendant (R. 117:84). Eldredge asked defendant if
he needed assistance. Defendant said his car had "broken down" and that "[i]t's back there
1

The trial court did not expressly refer to section 41-6-44 (6)(a) in sentencing
defendant. However, that section provides: "A third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two or more prior convictions under this section
is a third degree felony."
2

The record is silent concerning any disposition of defendant's conviction for
defendant's driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license (Count II).
3

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995).
3

a little ways by the dam," about a quarter of a mile away (R. 117:84, 117, 120). Eldredge
asked defendant to get into his patrol car in order to assist him (R. 117:84). Eldredge noticed
"the odor of alcohol" and noticed defendant's "red glassy eyes" (R. 117:85). Also when
speaking to defendant, Eldredge noticed "[h]is speech was slow and his sentence structure and
objectivity of conversation did not make sense" (R. 117: 85).
When Eldredge and defendant reached defendant's car it was "high centered over a
huge bush" on the south side of the dam, just west of a stop sign (R. 117:86, 88). Eldredge
saw track marks on the side of the highway, and it appeared to him that "the vehicle had lost
control and it had gone backwards over some bushes and down into a small bar ditch" (R.
117:86-87, 88). Eldredge noticed an individual in the back seat of the car (R. 117:88). He
was either asleep or passed out, and Eldredge could smell alcohol on him (R. 117:88).
Eldredge found two empty beer cans at the scene (R. 117:121, 128).
Based on what Eldredge both saw and smelled, he decided to give defendant field
sobriety tests to determine if he was under the influence of alcohol (R. 117:89). Defendant
failed all three field sobriety tests (R. 117:92).4 Eldredge determined, based on his experience
with over two hundred DUI cases and his observations of defendant, that defendant was not
able to safely operate a vehicle (R. 117:102,103,105,110). Eldredge arrested defendant and

4

Eldredge asked defendant to perform the one-legged stand and the nine-step
walk and turn, and to recite the alphabet (R. 117:89-92). Defendant could not perform
the one-legged stand without falling down (R. 117:89-90). Defendant was off balance
and could not step heel-to-toe during the nine-step walk and turn (R. 117:90-91).
Defendant missed the letters U and V when asked to recite the alphabet (R. 117:91-92).
4

took him into custody (R. 117:92).
At the station, about an hour after Eldredge first observed defendant on the highway,
defendant consented to a breathalyzer test (R. 117:92-95). The breathalyzer indicated that
defendant had a blood-alcohol level of. 163 (R. 117:97). Eldredge then interviewed defendant
(R. 117:98). When asked if he was operating a vehicle, defendant said, "I guess I did" (R.
117:99). He admitted to driving southbound near the dam (R. 117:99). Defendant said he
was "[t]rying to make it down to White Mesa, but later said he was drinking at "White Mesa"
(R. 117:100). He said he had been drinking beer earlier but did not know how much he had
consumed (R. 117:100). He said he had his first drink "[w]hen [h]e was eight years old" and
his last drink an "[h]our-couple of hours ago" (R. 117:100, 116). Defendant also admitted
to being under the influence of alcohol during the interview (R. 117:100). Eldredge asked
defendant where he was going and defendant said he was "[t]rying to park it," referring to his
car (R. 117:100, 106). Defendant said no one else was driving the car (R. 117:101). The
defense did not call any witnesses (R. 117:132-33).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court correctly recognized that defendant was neither surprised nor prejudiced
by any discrepancy between an information that alleged he had "at least three prior [DUI]
convictions," and the statute which required proof of only two prior convictions to enhance
his conviction for a subsequent DUI offense. Defendant knew at the preliminary hearing the

5

requirements of the statute and had been provided with evidence proving specific convictions.
Defendant cites no case in support of his claim that the State is required to prove allegations
in the information that are superfluous to a statutorily defined offense of which he is aware.
POINT II
Because defendant failed to preserve his claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, and because he has failed
to argue plain error on appeal, this court should decline to consider his claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT,
KNOWING HIS CONVICTION FOR DUI COULD BE ENHANCED
UNDER THE STATUTE BY PROOF OF ONLY TWO PRIOR DUI
CONVICTIONS, WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY AN INFORMATION
THAT ASSERTED HE HAD THREE PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Defendant claims that because the information asserted that he "ha[d] at least three
prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol" (Information, R. 1) (emphasis
added), the prosecution was required to prove those three prior convictions, rather than only
two such convictions required under section 41-6-44 (6)(a), a statutory requirement of which
he was aware months earlier at the preliminary hearing. Aplt. Br. at 10-11. Because
defendant's argument misapprehends the notice function served by the information and fails
to assert that defendant was prejudiced, it lacks merit.

6

A. The Factual Background.
The information charged defendant with driving under the influence of alcohol and
asserted the he had "at least three prior convictions" for the same offense (R. 1). At the
preliminary hearing, defendant pointed out that although he recognized that section 41-644(6)(a) only required proof of two prior DUI convictions within the preceding six years to
raise the charged offense to a third degree felony if he was convicted, the prosecution had
asserted three convictions in the information (R. 118:5). The prosecution argued that
defendant had notice that the statute required proof of only two prior DUI convictions within
the preceding six years (R. 118:5). The parties stipulated that the underlying DUI would be
tried to a jury and the issue of defendant's prior DUI convictions would be decided by the trial
court (R. 117:141-42; Aplt. Br. at 6). The prosecution did not amend the information before
defendant's jury trial to conform to the lesser statutory requirements (R. 118:5). Following
the jury trial on January 5, 2001, but before the trial court had decided the factual issue of
defendant's prior convictions, the prosecutor sought to amend the information to conform to
the evidence of the two prior convictions proven at the preliminary hearing (R. 92; 118:5).
At defendant's sentencing, on February 5,2001, the trial court found that it would have
been better for the prosecution to amend the information to conform to proof at the
preliminary hearing (Oral ruling following trial, R. 118:4-6, attached at Addendum B).
However, the court concluded:
[B]ut I don't think there's any question that the defendant had notice, certainly
by the time the preliminary hearing was over, that what the State was going to
7

be attempting to prove was two previous convictions within six years under the
present statute. Um, I don't think there's any - - any - -there can be a viable
claim of genuine surprise under those circumstances and, um, so - - well
assuming that there are two previous convictions . . . .
(R. 118:5-6). Defendant immediately acknowledged that the prosecution had proved two
convictions (R. 118:6). Accordingly, the trial court found defendant guilty of a third degree
felony (R. 118:6).
B. Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by
any variance between the information and the statutory
requirements for enhancement, of which he was aware.
The trial court correctly recognized that notice is the central function of the information
and that defendant could not claim prejudice through surprise if, notwithstanding any
irregularity in the information, he has clear notice of the charge he was required to defend
against. Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him
[and] to have a copy thereof...." In State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that failure to further limit the thirty-two month
period alleged in an information charging child sex abuse provided inadequate notice and
prevented him from formulating a defense. Id. at 1031-34. "As long as a defendant is
sufficiently apprised of the Stated evidence upon which the charge is based so that the
defendant can prepare to meet that case, the constitutional requirement is fulfilled." Id. at
1032 n.l.
Defendant cites no case in support of his claim that the State must prove allegations
8

in the information that are superfluous to the statutorily defined offense. Indeed, while the
State has been unable to find a case on point, the precise opposite of defendant's claim
appears to be the rule. See United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding that where an indictment charges several acts in the conjunctive and there is evidence
sufficient to support conviction on one of the acts charged, the conviction will not be
disturbed for lack of sufficiency of the evidence) (citations omitted).
Moreover, cases from other jurisdictions support the view that mere variance between
the allegations of the charging document and proof adduced at trial is not prejudicial if the
defendant was not misled by the discrepancy. See Stewart v. State, 856 S.W.2d 567, 570
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (in alleging prior conviction to enhance punishment, "[a] variance
between the allegation [of indictment] and proof is material and fatal only if [it] would
mislead a defendant to his prejudice"); Selvage v. State, 1YI S.W.2d 128,129 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (variance between date of prior conviction alleged in indictment, and date proved in
trial did not preclude finding that narcotics defendant was repeat offender absent showing that
variance misled defendant or prejudiced his position and also noting that "[i]t is well settled
that it is not necessary to allege prior convictions for the purposes of the enhancement of
punishment with the same particularity as must be used in charging the original offense").
See also State v. Alexander, 503 P.2d 777, 788 (Ariz. 1977) (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting state's motion to amend information so as to charge two prior felony
convictions, where record indicated that prosecutor gave defense counsel copies of almost all

9

documents and information pertaining to the priors and where defendant on appeal made no
showing of prejudice, and where no question was raised as to the sufficiency of proof of the
prior convictions).
In this case, defendant could not have been misled by any discrepancy between the
allegation in the information that he had "at least three prior convictions for driving under the
influence of alcohol," and the proof of only two prior convictions required by section 41 -6-44
(6)(a). The preliminary hearing was held on September 25, 2000 (R. 19-21). Defendant
himself was aware at the preliminary hearing that the statute required proof of only two prior
DUI convictions (R. 101). Defendant acknowledged following the jury trial on the underlying
DUI that the prosecutor had provided him, through discovery, with evidence of the two prior
convictions that were presented at the preliminary hearing, to wit: a 1998 conviction in Wayne
County and a 1994 conviction in San Juan County (R. 117:180-82). At the sentencing, more
than four months later, defendant was unable to explain to the trial court how he had been
prejudiced by the overstated allegations in the information (R. 118:4-6). In sum, because
defendant was fully aware of the statutory requirement enhancing his sentence and the proof
the prosecution intended to use to prove that requirement, it is plain defendant was not
prejudiced by any failure of the prosecution to more timely amend the information to conform
precisely to the statutory requirement.

10

POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM THAT
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS
CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL, AND BECAUSE HE HAS FAILED TO ARGUE PLAIN
ERROR ON APPEAL, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO
CONSIDER HIS CLAIM
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
driving under the influence of alcohol. Aplt. Br. at 12-14. The Court should decline to
consider the claim because it was not preserved in the trial court and because defendant has
not alleged exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal.
In State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.2d 346, the Utah Supreme Court held that in
order to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on appeal a defendant must first
preserve the claim in the trial court through a motion to dismiss the information or to arrest
judgment. Id. atf 14. Alternatively, a defendant must allege that "exceptional circumstances"
exist or "plain error" occurred. Id. at f 11.
In this case, defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence in the trial court and has failed to allege exceptional circumstances or plain error on
appeal. Therefore, the Court should decline to consider his claim. In any event, the evidence
recited on pages three through five herein amply demonstrates the sufficiency of the evidence
to support defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. See State v.
Gonzalez, 2000 UT App 136, f 10, 2 P.3d 954 ("[The appellate court] view[s] the evidence
in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,. . . and will reverse only if the evidence is so
11

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.") (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.

if)

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / /

day of October, 2001.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney-iaeneral

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Utah Constitution, article I, section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute
or rule.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44 (Supp. 1999)
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Copyright ©© 1953-1999 by the State of Utah and LEXIS Law Publishing, a
division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights
reserved.
41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or
unsafe blood alcohol concentration —Measurement of blood or breath
alcohol —Criminal punishment —Arrest without warrant —Penalties —
Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;

(b) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death;
(c) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local
ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 416-43; and
(d) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given within
two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows that the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of
Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a
third degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a
negligent manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive
hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 24
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or
home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational
series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility,
as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility
determines that the person has a problem condition involving alcohol or
drugs.

(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) w ithin six years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to:
(i) work in a compens
hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-sen ice vwrk program, or
home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment an '
!
series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehab"
as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree
felony.
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500;
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and
(hi) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol oi
drug dependency rehabilitation program providing intensive care or
inpatient treatment and long-term, closely supervised follow through after
treatment.
(c) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), the
court may require the person to participate in home confinement thro-i
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section nay
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a
result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person has
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education,
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after Ii lb
1, 1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilitation
costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction is a
second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years
of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or ^ L^gai: AW. • *certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitanor
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed
after July 1, 1993.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain,

mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court
would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second,
or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted
under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of,
or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section,
the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea,
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation,
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41 -6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for
the first time under Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court
under Subsection (12).
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period
the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under
Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was based on
the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways those persons who
have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License
Division of the Department of Public Safety an order to suspend or revoke
that person's driving privileges for a specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, lav/
enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts,
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which

require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be
monitored; and
(in) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(e) to place an electronic monitonng device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include an
alcohol detection breathalyzer*
(ii) restrict the amount of alcoln^
time the person is subject to horn,
(iii) set specific time and location lunduions that allow the person to
attend school educational classes, or employment and to tra,3 'el directly
between those activities and the person's home and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs asso
home confinement if
the person is determined to be indigei
. urt.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cov er the costs of waivers by
the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv),
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THE COURT:

I'm moving ahead at the request of the

Department of Corrections to take State of Utah vs. Rodney
Lehi, Case 9917-156.

I've read the memoranda from both

parties, urn, and the question--the initial question is whether
Mr. Lehi should be convicted of a Class-B Misdemeanor or a
Third Degree Felony.

Now do you have anything to add to what

you put in your memorandum, Mr. Halls?
MR. HALLS:

I don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you, Mr. Schultz?

MR. SCHULTZ: No, Judge.
THE COURT:

I'll stand on the memo.

I've gone back and listened to the tapes

of the--of the hearing where I took the verdict from the jury
and we discussed what I would be doing and I also went back to
the preliminary hearing and listened to the tape of the
preliminary hearing where we were discussing, ah, the--the
amended information charge--charging three priors, urn, and
this is what I found.

It's clear from the record of the--the

taking of the conversation that followed the taking of the
jury verdict that--that the defendant waived the right to have
a jury return a verdict, with respect to the enhancement
and--and that it was not a sentencing matter, but that it was
viewed by all parties as, ah, being a question of whether
those elements of the, urn, enhanced offense had been proven.
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When I looked at the preliminary hearing tape, it
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that there are two previous convictions, urn, I believe--what?
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MR. SCHULTZ:

They proved two.

3
4
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II
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THE COURT:

Then I believe he's--I'm going to find

him guilty of the Third Degree Felony.

It's a--it's certainly

6

II a live issue, but that's the way I come down on it, after

7

I listening to the tapes of those two previous hearings.

8

MR. SCHULTZ:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

All right.

Now he's already serving time, isn't he,

on a DUI?
11

MR. SCHULTZ:

12

MR. LEHI:

13

MR. SCHULTZ:

Is that what you had?

DUI?

Yes.

14

||

15

I send him to prison for another zero to five on this?

16

||

17

|| have an indication that he has as many as nine prior DUI's.

18

|| guess with that number of DUI's I would ask that the Court

19

|| sentence this one consecutive.

20

11

21

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HALLS:

Mr. Halls, are you just asking that I

Your Honor, I think he has--I think we

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Schultz?

22

II

MR. SCHULTZ:

I've spoken with him before about

23

|| whether or not he wanted a pre-sentence report and I just

24

|| asked him that question again.

25

II does not.

He indicated to me that he
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B.

I he trial court correctly excluded evidence of the victim's alleged
communicable disease as inadmissible under rule 412, Utah Rules of
Evidence,
ih in > J P |im< mits ili II i \ mi in I

MI CHIMI

iiiisi iinniiri 'urrWrii in pin v in n | m|

alleged v ictim engaged in sexual behavior" 01 '"offered to prove [an] alleged victim's
sexual predisposition" is inadmissible. Utah R. Evid. 412(a). Ihis inadmissible
• i i lei i :e is precisely the type that defendant sought to offer at trial

- ^ the trial court

correctly noted, evidence of a m in iipfntir ifiuailv liiiiisiinllril ili-

.

uindbly

contracted by the victim, clearly relates to the victim's other sexual behavior, and is
therefore inadmissible under rule 412. See id.
tumumg the inadmissib 1111 11 1111 communicable disease evidence,"
defendant attempts to qualify its exclusion as violative of h
present his defense under Subsection (bX3) of rule 412, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Br.
of Aplf at 33-36. Subsection (b)(3) makes admissible evidence which would violate the

claim fails, however, because he does not have an, unfettered rnnsrituiioiiiil nghi, mi | mi in
his defense See State v. Palmer, 786P.2d 248,249 (Utah App. 1990) (a defendant is not
entitled to constitutional rights 64unfettered by statutes and rules"); State v. Johns, 615

relevanc) rules); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,479-81 (Utah 1990) (constitutional
rights are subject to hearsay rules). In other words, defendant's right to put on a defense

^

^ ::\c ngru ^ aefend himself within the framework of the Utah Rules of Ev idente,
including rule 41 2. See id.\ Palmer, 786P.2d at 249. As explained above, evidence of
..^lie's pnor sexual behavior is clearly inadmissible under rule 412. See Utah R Evid
I Il
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violated b; the exclusion of the "communicable disease evidrnre ""
Additionally, defendant's alleged belief that Leslie had a communicable disease is
not relevant to the present incident. See State v Smith, 728 P.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Utah
I >«Sfi»in mii If 11 ur ni i lr In i in Li i ii

11. ni I ir nil miin mini ni ill il mini mini I ill Ik'tiit he relevant to a material

Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existed

t

that is of consequence to the determination . . . more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence

I tah R. Evid. 401. The basis for defendant's alleged belief is the

claims to have found and read. See R. 105-09; 186:5 That letter * a s \ i itt- m • : ne • j ear
and two months prior to the present incident. See R. 186:11. In the letter, the author
states that Leslie is fortunate that her alleged disease is "curable." See R, 105-09.

* 50. i i „ a is reasonable to infer that she would have immediately sought medical
attention and would have been cured many months before the present incident occurred.
Accordingly, the letter does not make defendant's involvement in present incident more
i kss lilu'l"1 ' IIIi,in if » vi iiilill \ 'iiiillin iiiiill illi r i: > .idbiiu'1!
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